Social Europe

politics, economy and employment & labour

  • Themes
    • European digital sphere
    • Recovery and resilience
  • Publications
    • Books
    • Dossiers
    • Occasional Papers
    • Research Essays
    • Brexit Paper Series
  • Podcast
  • Videos
  • Newsletter

The Real Cost Of Negative Integration In Europe

Amandine Crespy 28th January 2016

Amandine Crespy

Amandine Crespy

The death of 129 people in the Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015 triggered a discreet mea culpa from the 28 European Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs. They acknowledged that decisions had already been taken in May 2015 to strengthen controls on specific categories of European citizens, especially those returning into the EU from certain third countries. But these measures had not been implemented by national governments. In the same vein, ministers recognised that the sharing of information to fight terrorism was more the exception than the rule. The French interior minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, then claimed: “We are now in the phase of implementing Schengen”. Good!

Putting An End To Collective Irresponsibility

The different systemic crises the EU has been facing over the past five years (destabilisation of the Eurozone, refugee crisis, terrorist attacks) have exposed the exorbitant cost of negative integration. This means a mode of economic and territorial integration that has focused on opening up national spaces and supressing national rules without balancing this movement by establishing sufficient capacity at the European level. After experiencing several decades of peace and prosperity, Europeans have been carefree enough to maintain the illusion of national sovereignty and not draw the consequences of far-reaching regional integration.

The cost of this mistake is not merely an intellectual issue, it is neither theoretical nor simply economic: it is first and foremost a human cost. An entire generation of young Greeks, not to say young Europeans, is being sacrificed for the sake of a Monetary Union without sufficient financial and fiscal solidarity and with regulation of financial markets and banks still too weak. Heads of state and government have started to discuss a truly common asylum policy only because thousands of migrants have died in the Mediterranean and Syrian families have flowed onto the roads of Europe. And the basic rules for securing the Schengen area are starting to be implemented only because 129 people died in Paris. Of course, each of these problems has its own internal logic. But it is possible to consider them more broadly in order to understand the shortcomings of EU integration and maybe start to envisage solutions.

Freedom Does Not Mean Laisser-aller

Towards the end of the 1990s, the German political scientist Fritz Scharpf applied the distinction between negative and positive integration to the study of the EU. While negative integration occurs through the opening of national spaces (primarily markets) and the removal of national barriers to exchanges, positive integration implies the harmonization or adoption of common rules. A simplistic vision would oppose these two notions. In reality, negative and positive integration are more complementary than mutually exclusive. The question is rather where the point of equilibrium is between opening and closing, between deregulation and re-regulation.

With the ‘four freedoms’ enshrined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome – free circulation of goods, persons, capital and services – the philosophical roots as well as the operational functioning of the EU has been undeniably inspired by liberalism, both political and economic. The idea that political and social integration would follow on from economic integration coexisted for a long time with the liberal project. Yet, as the neoliberal turn took over globally, an amputated vision of European integration, solely focused on negative integration, has increasingly prevailed in the EU. Harmonization gave way to mutual recognition, the will to elaborate common rules in social policy disappeared in favour of a strategy based on competition between diverse levels of wealth and rights. The removal of internal borders was not accompanied by the creation of the necessary legal and operational instruments to create and protect external borders, etc.

Our job is keeping you informed!


Subscribe to our free newsletter and stay up to date with the latest Social Europe content.


We will never send you spam and you can unsubscribe anytime.

Thank you!

Please check your inbox and click on the link in the confirmation email to complete your newsletter subscription.

.

This echoes the distinction between negative freedom, that is the liberty to do something, and positive freedom, or the capacity to do something. This argument, though, should not serve the cause of excessive securitization at the expense of human rights. Rather, the point is that the deconstruction of certain capacities of the nation states involved with EU integration must be accompanied by a reconstruction of such capacities at the supranational level. The ways in which this should be done and the desirable balance in the distribution of competences should then be at the centre of public debate.

Increasing Polarisation Within National Societies

Of course, another option consists in rejecting European integration and advocating a return to national solutions and policies. Under the pressure of nationalist forces, some national governments and peoples have taken this course as they have effectively killed off the Schengen area. A majority of Danes voted ‘no’ to opt into common European Justice and Home Affairs rules in this field a few weeks ago.

However, there is no clear-cut evidence that a majority within both European elites and peoples wishes simply to revert to national solutions. This was shown by the Greek referendum on the Eurozone, and it remains to be seen whether a majority will back #Brexit from the EU. Legitimate voices against the post-democratic EU are becoming louder. Yet, in a globalised world where peace and prosperity can no longer be taken for granted, there is still a widely shared feeling among Europeans that there would be more to lose from EU disintegration. But for how long will that be?

The causes of inertia and obstacles to positive integration are well known: conflicts of interest and values among the member states, contrasted traditions and routines in the implementation of public policy, ideological bias within EU institutions. Yet, collective action problems can be overcome. In the face of crises, it is often the choice of more Europe which is made. At the same time, this brings about an increasing polarisation within our societies. Is a new type of far right about to become a majority force across Europe? Would this mean the end of the EU? These questions remain open.

Allowing Democratic Debate

For now, the problem we are facing is the discrepancy between the short run dimension of crisis management and the long run dimension of democratic deliberation. This is evident both at the national as well as European level. We have been witnessing the continuous strengthening of executives at the expense of parliaments and civil society over the past five years.


We need your support


Social Europe is an independent publisher and we believe in freely available content. For this model to be sustainable, however, we depend on the solidarity of our readers. Become a Social Europe member for less than 5 Euro per month and help us produce more articles, podcasts and videos. Thank you very much for your support!

Become a Social Europe Member

EMU reform generated a debate between contrasted visions, although it was very asymmetric and eventually led to more orthodoxy. Today, European governments are pursuing a policy of over-securitisation with restrictions on public liberties, the criminalisation of refugees, the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the state of emergency (in France), the erection of barbed wire barriers even between EU member states, etc. It would be very dangerous if the widespread fear among European citizens were instrumentally used to preclude from the outset any form of democratic debate over the root causes of terrorism and the responses needed to fight it.

Amandine Crespy

Amandine Crespy is associate professor in political science and European studies at the Université libre de Bruxelles.

Home ・ Politics ・ The Real Cost Of Negative Integration In Europe

Most Popular Posts

schools,Sweden,Swedish,voucher,choice Sweden’s schools: Milton Friedman’s wet dreamLisa Pelling
world order,Russia,China,Europe,United States,US The coming world orderMarc Saxer
south working,remote work ‘South working’: the future of remote workAntonio Aloisi and Luisa Corazza
Russia,Putin,assets,oligarchs Seizing the assets of Russian oligarchsBranko Milanovic
Russians,support,war,Ukraine Why do Russians support the war against Ukraine?Svetlana Erpyleva

Most Recent Posts

Gazprom,Putin,Nordstream,Putin,Schröder How the public loses out when politicians cash inKatharina Pistor
defence,europe,spending Ukraine and Europe’s defence spendingValerio Alfonso Bruno and Adriano Cozzolino
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,NATO,Ukraine The Ukraine war and NATO’s renewed credibilityPaul Rogers
transnational list,European constituency,European elections,European public sphere A European constituency for a European public sphereDomènec Ruiz Devesa
hydrogen,gas,LNG,REPowerEU EU hydrogen targets—a neo-colonial resource grabPascoe Sabido and Chloé Mikolajczak

Other Social Europe Publications

The transatlantic relationship
Women and the coronavirus crisis
RE No. 12: Why No Economic Democracy in Sweden?
US election 2020
Corporate taxation in a globalised era

Hans Böckler Stiftung Advertisement

Towards a new Minimum Wage Policy in Germany and Europe: WSI minimum wage report 2022

The past year has seen a much higher political profile for the issue of minimum wages, not only in Germany, which has seen fresh initiatives to tackle low pay, but also in those many other countries in Europe that have embarked on substantial and sustained increases in statutory minimum wages. One key benchmark in determining what should count as an adequate minimum wage is the threshold of 60 per cent of the median wage, a ratio that has also played a role in the European Commission's proposals for an EU-level policy on minimum wages. This year's WSI Minimum Wage Report highlights the feasibility of achieving minimum wages that meet this criterion, given the political will. And with an increase to 12 euro per hour planned for autumn 2022, Germany might now find itself promoted from laggard to minimum-wage trailblazer.


FREE DOWNLOAD

ETUI advertisement

Bilan social / Social policy in the EU: state of play 2021 and perspectives

The new edition of the Bilan social 2021, co-produced by the European Social Observatory (OSE) and the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), reveals that while EU social policy-making took a blow in 2020, 2021 was guided by the re-emerging social aspirations of the European Commission and the launch of several important initiatives. Against the background of Covid-19, climate change and the debate on the future of Europe, the French presidency of the Council of the EU and the von der Leyen commission must now be closely scrutinised by EU citizens and social stakeholders.


AVAILABLE HERE

Eurofound advertisement

Living and working in Europe 2021

The Covid-19 pandemic continued to be a defining force in 2021, and Eurofound continued its work of examining and recording the many and diverse impacts across the EU. Living and working in Europe 2021 provides a snapshot of the changes to employment, work and living conditions in Europe. It also summarises the agency’s findings on issues such as gender equality in employment, wealth inequality and labour shortages. These will have a significant bearing on recovery from the pandemic, resilience in the face of the war in Ukraine and a successful transition to a green and digital future.


AVAILABLE HERE

Foundation for European Progressive Studies Advertisement

EU Care Atlas: a new interactive data map showing how care deficits affect the gender earnings gap in the EU

Browse through the EU Care Atlas, a new interactive data map to help uncover what the statistics are often hiding: how care deficits directly feed into the gender earnings gap.

While attention is often focused on the gender pay gap (13%), the EU Care Atlas brings to light the more worrisome and complex picture of women’s economic inequalities. The pay gap is just one of three main elements that explain the overall earnings gap, which is estimated at 36.7%. The EU Care Atlas illustrates the urgent need to look beyond the pay gap and understand the interplay between the overall earnings gap and care imbalances.


BROWSE THROUGH THE MAP

About Social Europe

Our Mission

Article Submission

Membership

Advertisements

Legal Disclosure

Privacy Policy

Copyright

Social Europe ISSN 2628-7641

Social Europe Archives

Search Social Europe

Themes Archive

Politics Archive

Economy Archive

Society Archive

Ecology Archive

Follow us on social media

Follow us on Facebook

Follow us on Twitter

Follow us on LinkedIn

Follow us on YouTube