Social Europe

politics, economy and employment & labour

  • Themes
    • European digital sphere
    • Recovery and resilience
  • Publications
    • Books
    • Dossiers
    • Occasional Papers
    • Research Essays
    • Brexit Paper Series
  • Podcast
  • Videos
  • Newsletter

After The Elections The Real Battle For Europe Begins

Thomas Fazi 3rd June 2014 4 Comments

Thomas Fazi, Battle For Europe

Thomas Fazi

Taking stock of the results of the recent European elections is not an easy task. Many commentators have described the outcome as an ‘earthquake’, citing the surge in ‘anti-establishment’ parties, with voters supposedly lured by two ‘extremes’: the ultra-right and the extreme left. But this is a gross simplification of reality. As the Greek economist Yanis Varoufakis put to me in a recent interview, ‘Europeans were not lured by the two extremes. They drifted to one extreme: that of the misanthropic, racist, xenophobic, anti-European right’.

In total, nearly a third of incoming deputies in the chamber will be anti-EU ‘malcontents’, according to the think tank Open Europe. Interestingly, most of the support for such parties came from the wealthy countries of the core and of the North (most notably the UK, Denmark and France, and to a lesser degree Germany, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands) – which were largely spared the pain inflicted by the European establishment on the citizens of the periphery. In these countries, right-wing, eurosceptic or anti-EU parties have successfully exploited the legitimate (to a certain degree) fears and concerns of citizens resulting from the EU’s increasingly authoritarian and post-democratic posture, and from the hollowing out of national sovereignty and identity (due partly to the EU, and partly to the wider dynamics of the global economy) to peddle an even more reactionary, anti-democratic and authoritarian agenda.

It is interesting to note that in most cases these parties don’t criticise the EU for its insistence on austerity or for its regressive social and economic policies, but rather for its allegedly excessively progressive policies with regard to immigration or to market regulation. This is most evident in the UK, where David Cameron’s criticism of the EU has been directed against Brussels’ plans to limit working hours, introduce a continent-wide financial transaction tax or cap bankers’ bonuses – measures that most progressives would consider positive –, or for being too ‘soft’ on immigration.

This underscores the danger of mainstream parties flirting with anti-EU sentiments (which in some countries, such as the UK, have always been latent) for short-term electoral purposes, by diverting the attention away from the underlying causes of discontent and towards a convenient scapegoat – thereby creating a fertile breeding ground for nationalist, right-wing (and extreme right) movements and parties, such as UKIP. To a certain degree this applies to Germany as well, where the anti-euro AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) scooped up an impressive 7 per cent. It’s a surprising result for a party arguing for a return to the Deutsche Mark, considering that Germany is almost unanimously considered to have benefited, and greatly so, from the euro – as well as from the EU’s crisis management policies. I believe this can be partly explained by Merkel’s post-crisis narrative of ‘reluctant Europeanism’: even though the German chancellor never openly resorted to anti-EU propaganda (quite the contrary), she nonetheless stoked Germany’s latent holier-than-thou attitude by framing the sovereign bail-outs of periphery countries as loans handed out to the poor, irresponsible countries of the periphery by rich, responsible countries like Germany, partly creating the conditions for the rise of a pseudo-nationalist party like AfD.

France is the outlier here, not only because it is the only country on the continent – and one of the EU’s founding and largest member states for that – where an ultra-nationalist, post-Fascist party, the National Front (NF), topped the elections, but also because the right-wing turn was arguably more economically rooted than in other countries. It’s clear, in fact, that citizens voted at least as much against Hollande’s Socialist Party – and the President’s failure to live up to his pre-electoral promise of standing up to the EU’s austerity-driven economic policies – as they voted for the NF. The fact that eurosceptic or openly anti-EU parties came first in three major countries – the UK, Denmark and France – is undoubtedly a huge blow to the European integration process. At this point, a ‘Brexit’ from the EU at some point down the line – maybe followed by a Danish exit – doesn’t appear like such an unrealistic scenario anymore.

The Battle For Europe To Resolve The Crisis Of Meaning

This isn’t just a crisis of legitimacy for the EU – it’s an all-out crisis of meaning. That said, one shouldn’t make the mistake of overestimating the weight that the anti-EU right will have in the next European Parliament. As Open Europe writes, ‘these parties are not a coherent group, ranging from parties with experience of government through to fringe protest parties to outright neo-fascists. They also have widely differing views on a range of issues such as the eurozone, immigration and economic issues. As such, these parties will struggle to work together to put forward an alternative agenda for the European parliament.

Despite suffering a significant loss of seats, the two main establishment parties, the centre-left Party of European Socialists (PES) and the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), will still hold a solid majority in Parliament. While this means that a break-up of the EU or eurozone – a development that could have potentially disastrous consequences for a number of countries and would likely lead to a nationalistic and regressive/conservative backlash (especially given the parties calling for such a solution) – remains an unlikely scenario in the short-medium term (the EU can survive the exit of one or more countries), it also means that we are likely to witness a business-as-usual attitude: i.e., a continuation of the vicious policy of austerity, neoliberalism and top-down authoritarian federalism which is at the root of Europe’s deep social, economic, political and spiritual crisis.

As Varoufakis notes, ‘there is no sign on the horizon that the elites will respond creatively either to the economic crisis or to its political ramifications. They may “go easy” on austerity, to absorb some of the shockwaves caused by public discontent, but they have neither the analytical power nor the interest in proceeding with the architectural changes necessary to reverse the decline’.

And this brings us to the crucial role of periphery countries. Interestingly, in most of these countries – especially Greece, Spain and Ireland –, despite widespread anger at the catastrophic austerity policies imposed by the European establishment, the ‘protest vote’ mostly went to anti-austerity radical left parties seeking a solution to the crisis within the EU and the eurozone – not to the anti-EU right. In this they have proven to be much more politically mature than their Northern peers. The most notable case is Greece, where SYRIZA became the first radical left party in the continent’s history to win a European election.

All in all, the broad progressive anti-austerity camp – if we include the more left-leaning wings of the ALDE and Greens/EFA groups – will be the third force in the next Parliament, and can play a crucial role in avoiding a disastrous ‘grand coalition’ between the PES and EPP. It is now up to the European progressive movement – at all levels: in the European Parliament, within single member states and, of course, on the streets – to seize upon this historic opportunity and show that there is an alternative to both the regressive nationalist solution offered by the extreme right and the austerity-driven and neoliberal Union envisioned by the elites, and that a radical, progressive overhaul of the EU and monetary union (in the direction of a genuine European supranational democracy and welfare state) is possible. This also means overcoming the widening core-periphery division engineered by the financial-political elite, by highlighting the commonality of interests and struggles of all European citizens. It might be the last chance we get.

Thomas Fazi

Thomas Fazi is a writer, journalist and activist. He is the author of "The Battle for Europe: How an Elite Hijacked a Continent – and How We Can Take It" Back (Pluto, 2014) and "Reclaiming the State: A Progressive Vision of Sovereignty for a Post-Neoliberal World", co-authored with economist Bill Mitchell (Pluto, 2017).

Home ・ Politics ・ After The Elections The Real Battle For Europe Begins

Most Popular Posts

schools,Sweden,Swedish,voucher,choice Sweden’s schools: Milton Friedman’s wet dreamLisa Pelling
world order,Russia,China,Europe,United States,US The coming world orderMarc Saxer
south working,remote work ‘South working’: the future of remote workAntonio Aloisi and Luisa Corazza
Russia,Putin,assets,oligarchs Seizing the assets of Russian oligarchsBranko Milanovic
Russians,support,war,Ukraine Why do Russians support the war against Ukraine?Svetlana Erpyleva

Most Recent Posts

trade,values,Russia,Ukraine,globalisation Peace and trade—a new perspectiveGustav Horn
biodiversity,COP15,China,climate COP15: negotiations must come out of the shadowsSandrine Maljean-Dubois
reproductive rights,abortion,hungary,eastern europe,united states,us,poland The uneven battlefield of reproductive rightsAndrea Pető
LNG,EIB,liquefied natural gas,European Investment Bank Ukraine is no reason to invest in gasXavier Sol
schools,Sweden,Swedish,voucher,choice Sweden’s schools: Milton Friedman’s wet dreamLisa Pelling

Other Social Europe Publications

The transatlantic relationship
Women and the coronavirus crisis
RE No. 12: Why No Economic Democracy in Sweden?
US election 2020
Corporate taxation in a globalised era

ETUI advertisement

Bilan social / Social policy in the EU: state of play 2021 and perspectives

The new edition of the Bilan social 2021, co-produced by the European Social Observatory (OSE) and the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), reveals that while EU social policy-making took a blow in 2020, 2021 was guided by the re-emerging social aspirations of the European Commission and the launch of several important initiatives. Against the background of Covid-19, climate change and the debate on the future of Europe, the French presidency of the Council of the EU and the von der Leyen commission must now be closely scrutinised by EU citizens and social stakeholders.


AVAILABLE HERE

Eurofound advertisement

Living and working in Europe 2021

The Covid-19 pandemic continued to be a defining force in 2021, and Eurofound continued its work of examining and recording the many and diverse impacts across the EU. Living and working in Europe 2021 provides a snapshot of the changes to employment, work and living conditions in Europe. It also summarises the agency’s findings on issues such as gender equality in employment, wealth inequality and labour shortages. These will have a significant bearing on recovery from the pandemic, resilience in the face of the war in Ukraine and a successful transition to a green and digital future.


AVAILABLE HERE

Foundation for European Progressive Studies Advertisement

EU Care Atlas: a new interactive data map showing how care deficits affect the gender earnings gap in the EU

Browse through the EU Care Atlas, a new interactive data map to help uncover what the statistics are often hiding: how care deficits directly feed into the gender earnings gap.

While attention is often focused on the gender pay gap (13%), the EU Care Atlas brings to light the more worrisome and complex picture of women’s economic inequalities. The pay gap is just one of three main elements that explain the overall earnings gap, which is estimated at 36.7%. The EU Care Atlas illustrates the urgent need to look beyond the pay gap and understand the interplay between the overall earnings gap and care imbalances.


BROWSE THROUGH THE MAP

Hans Böckler Stiftung Advertisement

Towards a new Minimum Wage Policy in Germany and Europe: WSI minimum wage report 2022

The past year has seen a much higher political profile for the issue of minimum wages, not only in Germany, which has seen fresh initiatives to tackle low pay, but also in those many other countries in Europe that have embarked on substantial and sustained increases in statutory minimum wages. One key benchmark in determining what should count as an adequate minimum wage is the threshold of 60 per cent of the median wage, a ratio that has also played a role in the European Commission's proposals for an EU-level policy on minimum wages. This year's WSI Minimum Wage Report highlights the feasibility of achieving minimum wages that meet this criterion, given the political will. And with an increase to 12 euro per hour planned for autumn 2022, Germany might now find itself promoted from laggard to minimum-wage trailblazer.


FREE DOWNLOAD

About Social Europe

Our Mission

Article Submission

Membership

Advertisements

Legal Disclosure

Privacy Policy

Copyright

Social Europe ISSN 2628-7641

Social Europe Archives

Search Social Europe

Themes Archive

Politics Archive

Economy Archive

Society Archive

Ecology Archive

Follow us on social media

Follow us on Facebook

Follow us on Twitter

Follow us on LinkedIn

Follow us on YouTube