Social Europe

politics, economy and employment & labour

  • Themes
    • European digital sphere
    • Recovery and resilience
  • Publications
    • Books
    • Dossiers
    • Occasional Papers
    • Research Essays
    • Brexit Paper Series
  • Podcast
  • Videos
  • Newsletter

Class struggle à la droite

Claus Leggewie 23rd January 2020

Populism is boosted by economic crises, but its roots are cultural.

right-wing populism
Claus Leggewie

Populism is a method. It works by mobilising an imaginary homogenous entity called ‘the people’ against an equally ill-defined and generally despised ‘elite’, thus radically simplifying the political and social field. Such simplifications have served to orchestrate conflicts since the 19th century and in particular during economic and cultural crises—on the left, in terms of a class struggle against the powers that be; on the right, in terms of a confrontation with an ‘other’, be it foreigners or minorities.

Sometimes these two tendencies have gone hand in hand—for instance, when migrant workers have been portrayed as wage-squeezing competitors. In fact, though, a populism that purports to be about solidarity with the ‘common people’ always promotes social disunity.

Ethnic constructs

As a catchphrase in political debates, populism may be useful; a productive analytical concept it however certainly is not. The ‘people’ our modern-day, nationalist populists champion are no longer defined socio-economically (as in the ‘proletariat’). Rather, the populists employ ethnic constructs (such as Biodeutsche or français de souche), which suggest a homogenous community with a shared ancestry, a long history and a solid identity.

It is to these ‘people’—not the actual, pluralist demos—that populists ascribe an authority which exceeds that of institutions: ‘The people stand above the law,’ as a slogan of the Austrian ‘Freedom Party’ goes.

Our job is keeping you informed!


Subscribe to our free newsletter and stay up to date with the latest Social Europe content.


We will never send you spam and you can unsubscribe anytime.

Thank you!

Please check your inbox and click on the link in the confirmation email to complete your newsletter subscription.

.

In this view, there is no legitimate ‘representation’ through democratic processes. Instead, ‘the people’ form movements which back charismatic leaders and legitimise them retroactively by means of plebiscites. Right-wing movements may be diverse, but what they all have in common is a worldview that is utterly authoritarian (and usually patriarchal and homophobic too).

One’s own nation, ethnically defined, takes centre-stage—think ‘America first!’ or La France d’abord! Aggression is however (thus far) mainly being directed inwards, towards supposed ‘enemies of the people’—as the US president, Donald Trump, has designated members of the Democratic opposition and the ‘mainstream media’—or towards (im)migrants who demand equal rights and treatment.

Harsh rejection

Populism is frequently regarded (and sometimes excused) as an expression of economic woes. Yet ethno-nationalist authoritarianism is motivated less by feelings of inferiority—in terms of status, income or opportunities in life—than by a harsh rejection of the global south’s demands for participation in the wealth still generated within neocolonial structures.

In Germany, such ressentiments were first utilised during the 1980s, when the ‘REPublicans’ pursued a strategy of ‘prosperity chauvinism’. With refugee movements on the rise, these recently intensified and are now increasingly expressed through violent acts. Hostility towards refugees, Islamophobia, rejection of minority rights—the favorite obsessions of the right may be triggered by economic developments but they are essentially of a cultural nature, including downright racism.

While the majority of supporters and voters of right-wing parties are middle-class or well-off (and male, for that matter), we do also find among them low-skilled, low-income workers in precarious employments who are afraid of declining even further and are categorically opposed to a global economy that is merciless but has generally been described as without alternative—not least by social-democratic governments.


We need your support


Social Europe is an independent publisher and we believe in freely available content. For this model to be sustainable, however, we depend on the solidarity of our readers. Become a Social Europe member for less than 5 Euro per month and help us produce more articles, podcasts and videos. Thank you very much for your support!

Become a Social Europe Member

And no doubt one factor in the rise of the new authoritarianism is the increase in social inequality since 2008; even more important are the feelings of being marginalised on the part of those who live in deindustrialised rural areas devoid of infrastructure—‘somewheres’ who feel attached to their native regions and whose anger at the cosmopolitan ‘anywheres’ (supposedly rootless) won’t be placated by welfare benefits.

Conspiracy theories

Unlike during the 19th and early 20th centuries, such deprivation no longer results in leftist reactions, such as mass support for socialist reform or revolutionary movements. A nationalist narrative dominates discourses nowadays.

Indeed, it is largely the same one already championed by 20th-century fascism, featuring anti-Semitic conspiracy theories (directed, for instance, against the philanthropist George Soros) and dystopian visions of a ‘great replacement’ of populations (as advanced by the French writer Renaud Camus). Right-wingers are convinced that the European Union plans systematically to replace white, Christian populations with Muslims, Africans and Asians—what the Alternative fur Deutschland regional leader Björn Höcke has described as Umvolkung. In effect, their own agenda boils down to ‘ethnic cleansing’.

These political strategies of the new populists are clearly inspired by Hitler’s ‘national socialism’. Which is precisely why they downplay the importance of the Nazi terror regime—Alexander Gauland of the AfD called it ‘just a flyspeck’ within Germany’s glorious century-long history—and attack the postwar culture of commemoration.

In the Trump-era US, extremist white-supremacist tendencies have begun to infiltrate the mainstream as well: there it is mostly Latinos and Hispanics who bear the brunt because a growing number of whites fear the loss of their—demographic, religious and cultural—hegemony. The first concrete results of these fears are Trump’s ‘great wall’ on the Mexican border and more inhuman immigration-detention practices than ever before.

Fading line

With respect to economic and social policy, the Rassemblement National, the Austrian and Dutch ‘Freedom’ parties, and the Scandinavian far-right have traditionally favoured the ‘neoliberal’ course of shrinking the welfare state. Of late, however, European right-wing parties have increasingly focused on bestowing exclusive financial gifts on their ethnic in-group—the prime example being the nativist birth promotion recently adopted in Hungary and Poland.

Such policies contribute to the fading of the conflict line that once firmly separated left and right, which mirrored structural contrasts between the classes and resulted in a preference for either economic liberalism or interventionist politics. In our post-industrial societies, tectonic shifts are taking place, but the gap that is newly forming is primarily a cultural one.

It is the gap, already hinted at, between cosmopolitans and communitarians, who radically differ in their assessment of globalisation and of transnational institutions like the EU. The old dichotomy of progressives versus conservatives is being superseded by an antagonism between a populist right and a new (sub)urban and environmentalist left.

To put it in colour terminology, familiar to German and Austrian readers: red and black are being ousted by green and blue (the color of both the AfD and the FPÖ, though one feels tempted to call them brown). And it is no coincidence that most authoritarian nationalists cling to fossil-fuel industrialism, deny the reality of climate change and delay or thwart measures for climate and species protection.

Claus Leggewie

Claus Leggewie teaches political science and holds the Ludwig Boerne chair at the University of Giessen in Germany. He is author of Jetzt! Opposition, Protest, Widerstand (Cologne 2019) and co-editor of Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik.

Home ・ Politics ・ Class struggle à la droite

Most Popular Posts

schools,Sweden,Swedish,voucher,choice Sweden’s schools: Milton Friedman’s wet dreamLisa Pelling
world order,Russia,China,Europe,United States,US The coming world orderMarc Saxer
south working,remote work ‘South working’: the future of remote workAntonio Aloisi and Luisa Corazza
Russia,Putin,assets,oligarchs Seizing the assets of Russian oligarchsBranko Milanovic
Russians,support,war,Ukraine Why do Russians support the war against Ukraine?Svetlana Erpyleva

Most Recent Posts

trade,values,Russia,Ukraine,globalisation Peace and trade—a new perspectiveGustav Horn
biodiversity,COP15,China,climate COP15: negotiations must come out of the shadowsSandrine Maljean-Dubois
reproductive rights,abortion,hungary,eastern europe,united states,us,poland The uneven battlefield of reproductive rightsAndrea Pető
LNG,EIB,liquefied natural gas,European Investment Bank Ukraine is no reason to invest in gasXavier Sol
schools,Sweden,Swedish,voucher,choice Sweden’s schools: Milton Friedman’s wet dreamLisa Pelling

Other Social Europe Publications

The transatlantic relationship
Women and the coronavirus crisis
RE No. 12: Why No Economic Democracy in Sweden?
US election 2020
Corporate taxation in a globalised era

Hans Böckler Stiftung Advertisement

Towards a new Minimum Wage Policy in Germany and Europe: WSI minimum wage report 2022

The past year has seen a much higher political profile for the issue of minimum wages, not only in Germany, which has seen fresh initiatives to tackle low pay, but also in those many other countries in Europe that have embarked on substantial and sustained increases in statutory minimum wages. One key benchmark in determining what should count as an adequate minimum wage is the threshold of 60 per cent of the median wage, a ratio that has also played a role in the European Commission's proposals for an EU-level policy on minimum wages. This year's WSI Minimum Wage Report highlights the feasibility of achieving minimum wages that meet this criterion, given the political will. And with an increase to 12 euro per hour planned for autumn 2022, Germany might now find itself promoted from laggard to minimum-wage trailblazer.


FREE DOWNLOAD

ETUI advertisement

Bilan social / Social policy in the EU: state of play 2021 and perspectives

The new edition of the Bilan social 2021, co-produced by the European Social Observatory (OSE) and the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), reveals that while EU social policy-making took a blow in 2020, 2021 was guided by the re-emerging social aspirations of the European Commission and the launch of several important initiatives. Against the background of Covid-19, climate change and the debate on the future of Europe, the French presidency of the Council of the EU and the von der Leyen commission must now be closely scrutinised by EU citizens and social stakeholders.


AVAILABLE HERE

Eurofound advertisement

Living and working in Europe 2021

The Covid-19 pandemic continued to be a defining force in 2021, and Eurofound continued its work of examining and recording the many and diverse impacts across the EU. Living and working in Europe 2021 provides a snapshot of the changes to employment, work and living conditions in Europe. It also summarises the agency’s findings on issues such as gender equality in employment, wealth inequality and labour shortages. These will have a significant bearing on recovery from the pandemic, resilience in the face of the war in Ukraine and a successful transition to a green and digital future.


AVAILABLE HERE

Foundation for European Progressive Studies Advertisement

EU Care Atlas: a new interactive data map showing how care deficits affect the gender earnings gap in the EU

Browse through the EU Care Atlas, a new interactive data map to help uncover what the statistics are often hiding: how care deficits directly feed into the gender earnings gap.

While attention is often focused on the gender pay gap (13%), the EU Care Atlas brings to light the more worrisome and complex picture of women’s economic inequalities. The pay gap is just one of three main elements that explain the overall earnings gap, which is estimated at 36.7%. The EU Care Atlas illustrates the urgent need to look beyond the pay gap and understand the interplay between the overall earnings gap and care imbalances.


BROWSE THROUGH THE MAP

About Social Europe

Our Mission

Article Submission

Membership

Advertisements

Legal Disclosure

Privacy Policy

Copyright

Social Europe ISSN 2628-7641

Social Europe Archives

Search Social Europe

Themes Archive

Politics Archive

Economy Archive

Society Archive

Ecology Archive

Follow us on social media

Follow us on Facebook

Follow us on Twitter

Follow us on LinkedIn

Follow us on YouTube